Country: Iran

Year: 1945

Head of government: Mohsen Sadr

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party. Perspective monde identifies leader party as independent. World Statesmen (2020) identifies party as non party. Abrahamian (1982) notes that “the National Unionist allied with the Patriots and Democrats to support Mohsen Sadr, an eighty-year-old arch conservative judge who had served as Reza Shah’s watchdog over the Qum clergy and had presided over the execution of liberal intellectuals during the Constitutional Revolution.” The leader profile identifies the Shah as rightist. Tachau (1994) note of the National Union Party “The NUP, a conservative anti-British, anti-Soviet organization.” Abrahamian notes that the British Ambassador to Iran at the time, Bullard, “described him [Sadr] as a “stiff reactionary ex-mulla”.” Abrahamian notes also that “fears of the opposition [to Sadr] were intensified as Sadr implemented his hard-line policies… [including] appointing a conservative Anglophile, General Arfa, as chief of general staff and instructed him to arm anti-Tudeh tribes and purge “leftist” officers from the armed forces.” For reference, Abrahamian notes that at the time, the Tudeh party at the time were criticized by conservative writers of the era of having “a satanical doctrine of class struggles… [and] incited ignorant workers to violate the sacred right of private property… The uprising proves that the Tudeh is an enemy of private property.” Ahmad (nd) states that “During his few months of governorship, Mohsen Sadr was severely opposed by the Tudeh party and the minority group of the parliament led by Dr. Mosadegh.”

Year: 1946

Head of government: Ahmad Qawamol-Saltana

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party. Fairbank (1998)identifies Saltana’s party as Democratic party: “Also illustrative is Qavam al-Sultaneh’s Democratic party, created in 1945 by this adroit Prime Minister in order to counter the growing popularity of the Tudeh party.” Abrahamian (1982) notes the leftist nature of the Tudeh party, mentioning that conservative editorials at the time criticized the Tudeh having as “a satanical doctrine of class struggles… [and] incited ignorant workers to violate the sacred right of private property… The uprising proves that the Tudeh is an enemy of private property.” Tachau (1994) notes “After several months of intense pressure, Qavam… altered course by moving against the left and veering sharply rightward about a year after his initial leftward tilt. Abrahamian (1982) also notes that Qavam was a “veteran statesmen who had headed four cabinets before Reza Shah forced him into exile… [but] when Qavam reentered politics in 1941… The Shah in a conversation with the British minister, depicted Qavam as a dangerous schemer… waiting for the Russians to implement some desperate design.” Additionally, Abrahamian notes that Qavam was supported by “these deputies from Azerbaijan.” The Azerbaijan caucus “was led by Qajar aristocrats who, out of opposition to both the shah and the British, were prepared to work closely with the Soviet Union as long as the latter did not advocate social revolution in Iran.” Abrahamian continues that “The public image he [Qavam] ought to project was that of a decisive leader in full command of the situation, but all the while he was under constant challenge from both the right-the shah, the army, and the tribal chiefs- and the left-the Tudeh, the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan.” He continues that “Qavam was thus different things to different men at different times… The shah opposed him in 1941-1946… helped him in 1946-1947 as a bulwark against communism… conversely the [leftist] Tudeh trusted him in 1941-1946 as a constitutionalist challenging the militarists; turned against him in 1941-1946 as a representative of the landed aristocracy… and attacked him in 1952 as the lackey of the of the shah, of the British, and of the ruling class.” Finally, Abrahamian notes that despite the confusing alliances and “behind the enigmas… lay a man committed to three major goals… weakening the monarchy and establishing civilian control over the military… As a wealthy landowner, grandson of a court minister, son of a Qajar noblewoman, and husband of a rich aristocrat, Qavam naturally preferred to keep the status quo rather than run the risk of a social revolution... Finally… Qavam intended to counterbalance Russia against Britain.” Abrahamian mentions that during his tenure Ahmad Qawamol-Saltana “in mid-June took the precaution of forming his own organization named the Democrat party (Hizb-i Demokrat). He had two implicit, and paradoxical goal, reasons for establishing the new organization… He hoped to use it to mobilize noncommunist reformers steal the thunder from the left, and hence build a counterbalance to the Tudeh... As one of Qavam’s advisors admitted later, “the situation forced us to adopt a radical image to compete with the revolutionaries” The Democrat party was thus a double-edged sword directed at the left as well as the right.” Abrahamian mentions the Democratic party as a part of a conservative bloc, saying that Hakimi’s policies were first “aimed at winning over the Liberals and Individuals… [and] The second part intended to calm the fears of the conservative deputies, especially the Patriots, Democrats, and National Unionists.”

Year: 1947

Head of government: Ebrahim Hakimi

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party. Perspective monde identifies leader party as independent. World Statesmen (2020) identifies party as HT (Hezb-e Taraqqi / Party for Progress). Abrahamian (1982) notes that prior to the Moshen administration in 1945, a “crisis split… the National Union into two… [but] they settled on a compromise candidate, Ibrahim Hakimi. A former court doctor who had participated in the constitutional revolution and in the Democrat party, Hakimi received support, albeit lukewarm support, of royalists and antiroyalists.” Abrahamian continues that Hakimi was a “respectable statesmen… he was backed half-heartedly by all groups [so] after receiving a tepid majority, Hakimi tried to form a “national government above factional politics.” By choosing ministers without close affiliations to the parliamentary fractions, Hakimi intended to continue half satisfying all groups.” Abraham continues that in 1947 “the supporters and opponents of Sadr’s administration reached a compromise. The former, especially the National Unionists, promised to give Hakimi another chance… the new premier came into office with a complex plan combining Bayat’s “soft” attitude towards the Soviet Union with Sadr’s “hard” treatment of the Tudeh party.” Abrahamian notes the leftist nature of the Tudeh party, mentioning that conservative editorials at the time criticized the Tudeh having as “a satanical doctrine of class struggles… [and] incited ignorant workers to violate the sacred right of private property… The uprising proves that the Tudeh is an enemy of private property.” Continuing back to the nature of Hakimi’s plan, Abrahamian explicates that “The first part of the plan aimed at winning over the Liberals and Individuals, while persuading the Soviets to evacuate Iran and withdraw their protections of dissident movements. The second part intended to calm the fears of the conservative deputies, especially the Patriots, Democrats, and National Unionists.”

Years: 1948-1949

Head of government: Mohammad Said Maraghei

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party. Perspective monde identifies leader party as independent. World Statesmen (2020) identifies party as non party.

Year: 1950

Head of government: Ali Razmara

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party. Perspective monde does not identify leader party. World Statesmen identifies party as non-party. Abrahamian (1982) notes that at the time of his promotion to Chief of General Staff under Qavam, “’General Ali’ Razmara… came from a lower-middle-class home, intensely distrusted Britain, and thus sympathized with Russia and leftist junior officers.” By his appointment to Prime Minister however, Abrahamian notes that he was “A high-handed but independent-minded officer… [who] had drawn much closer to the shah in recent years as they had cooperated to protect the military from Qavam… A self-made man married to the sister of a prominent left-wing author, he was prepared to criticize the rich openly, woo the radical intellectuals, and thus widen the gap between the Tudeh and the National Front.” Abrahamian continues that “Razmara acted as expected… introduc[ing] two major reform bills: one for distributing state lands among the peasantry; and the other to establish the provincial assemblies promised by the constitutional laws. To further woo the left he refused to send troops to the Korea war, signed a trade treaty with the Soviet Union, and slightly eased the restrictions on the Tudeh party. When ten Tudeh leaders escaped from prison, it was generally rumored that Razmara had intentionally helped by appointing a leftist officer as their jailor.” Rubin (1981) notes “The *New York* Times, in its editorial on the Razmara assassination…. Concluded, [Razmara and the Shah] had provided what was perhaps the best change ‘to transform Iran from a back war and still feudal country into a modern state and society as the best defense against Communism’.”

Years: 1951-1952

Head of government: Mohammad Mossadegh

Ideology: Left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies head of government’s party as NF (National Front). Perspective monde identifies leader party as National Front. *Historical Dictionary of Political Parties in the Middle East and North Africa* identifies NF as left: “The National Front is a Democratic opposition party founded by Muhammad Mossadegh and other secular Iranian leaders of the Nationalist, Liberal, and Social-Democratic Orientation.” Perspective monde identifies ideology as centrist. Rulers notes “He built considerable political strength on his call for the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry.” Abrahamian (1982) notes that Mossadegh had support from leftist coalitions, stating that “the National Front-supported by the Tudeh-called for protest strikes and mass demonstrations in favor of Mossadeq.” Abrahamian continues “Mossadeq followed up his victory with a rapid succession of blows struck not only at the shah and the military but also at the landed aristocracy and the two Houses of Parliament… He transferred Reza Shah’s lands back to the state; cut the palace’s budget, and allocated the savings to the Health Ministry… and refused to act against Tudeh papers that denounced the court as “the center of corruption, treason and espionage”.” Abrahamian continues that “Mossadeq, the constitutional lawyer who had meticulously quoted the fundamental laws against the shah, was now bypassing the same laws and resorting to the theory of the general will. The liberal aristocrat who had in the past appealed predominantly to the middle class was mobilizing the lower classes. The moderate reformer who had proposed to disenfranchise illiterates was seeking the acclaim of the national masses… Mossadeq appeared to be in full control. He has packed his supporters into the cabinet and the bureaucracy. He had stripped the court of military, financial, and political influence, reduced the monarch to a ceremonial figure head… [and] had routed the aristocratic opposition, dissolving parliament and decreeing land reforms.” The Mohammad Mossadegh project notes “As leader of Iran, Mossadegh sponsored laws for a “clean government” and independent court systems, defended freedom of religion and political affiliations, and promoted free elections. He implemented many social reforms and fought for the rights of women, workers, and peasants. A fund was created to pay for rural development projects and give assistance to farmers… his [Mossadegh’s] policies were frequently opposed by the Shah, army generals, leading clerics, landowners, the Tudeh (communist) party… Nevertheless, Mossadegh could always rely on upon the support of the people.”

Years: 1953-1954

Head of government: Fazlollah Zahedi

Ideology: Right

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party. Perspective monde does not identify leader party. *The Political Economy of Modern Iran* identifies Zahedi as independent and right: “The Cabinet was headed by Zahedi himself… a conservative politician” whose mission was to “consolidate the new régimes power, break the Popular Movement, destroy the Tudeh Party, conclude a new oil agreement, and normalize the political economy.” Kauz et al. (2001) note that “after the coup d’etat of August 1953 the Shah assumed full control of the political process.” The leader profile identifies Shah Reza as rightist.

Years: 1955-1956

Head of government: Hossein Ala

Ideology: Right

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party. Perspective monde identifies leader party as independent. *The Political Economy of Modern Iran* identifies Ala as independent and right: “Husein Ala, the old conservative politician… succeeded Zahedi for a short period.” Abrahamian (2008) notes, “[The shah] amended the constitution, giving himself the authority to appoint prime ministers… Of the eight men who headed cabinets between 1953 and 1977, all but two were his personal favorites. The exceptions were General Zahedi and Ali Amini… All the other six premiers were the shah’s nominees.” Kauz et al. (2001) note that “after the coup d’etat of August 1953 the Shah assumed full control of the political process. Although elections continued to be held, parties and open political dissent were outlawed.” The leader profile identifies Shah Reza as rightist.

Years: 1957-1959

Head of government: Manuchehr Ekbal

Ideology: Right

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party. Perspective Monde identifies Ekbal as right: “extrême droite.” Perspective monde identifies leader party as Nationalists’ Party. Nyrop (1978)identifies Ekbal’s party as Maliyuun Party: “The government party, the Maliyuun (National) Party was formed in 1958 under the leadership of prime minister Manuchehr Eqbal.” Nyrop (1978) notes, “In 1957… the shah moved to create a two-party system that was designed to provide an orderly means of resolving political conflicts and legitimizing the shah’s cautious reform and development policies.” Abrahamian (2008) notes, “[The shah] amended the constitution, giving himself the authority to appoint prime ministers… Of the eight men who headed cabinets between 1953 and 1977, all but two were his personal favorites. The exceptions were General Zahedi and Ali Amini… All the other six premiers were the shah’s nominees.” Kauz et al. (2001) note that “after the coup d’etat of August 1953 the Shah assumed full control of the political process. Although elections continued to be held, parties and open political dissent were outlawed.” The leader profile identifies Shah Reza as rightist.

Year: 1960

Head of government: Jaafar Sharif-Emami

Ideology: Rightist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government party. Perspective monde identifies leader party as independent. Rulers notes that “During his first term as prime minister, he attempted to institute economic reforms.” Historical Dictionary of Iran (1995) notes that “His interests seemingly leaned more towards politics as an instrument of financial gain … [and] he instituted plans for economic recovery which included restrictions on imports and tight controls on foreign exchange… [However] his tenure was short and marked by internal opposition from the National Front.” Abrahamian (1982) contradicts this party affiliation by stating “the shah stopped the voting and replaced Premier Eqbal, who also headed the National party, with Ja’far Sharif Emami who, although a veteran courtier, belonged to no party.” Abrahamian (2008) notes, “[The shah] amended the constitution, giving himself the authority to appoint prime ministers… Of the eight men who headed cabinets between 1953 and 1977, all but two were his personal favorites. The exceptions were General Zahedi and Ali Amini… All the other six premiers were the shah’s nominees.” Kauz, Sharoudi, Rieck (2001) note that “after the coup d’etat of August 1953 that the Shah assumed full control of the political process.” The leader profile identifies Shah Reza as rightist.

Year: 1961

Head of government: Ali Amini

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party. Perspective monde identifies leader party as independent. *The Political Economy of Modern Iran* identifies Amini as independent. Historical Dictionary of Iran (1995) notes that the Shah replaced Emami with Amini “though distrusted by the Shah, who feared political and economic reform, Amini was preferred over the National Front contender… [He] carried out land reform and International Monetary Fund directives.” *Historical Dictionary of Political Parties in the Middle East and North Africa* identifies NF as left: “The National Front is a Democratic opposition party founded by Muhammad Mossadegh and other secular Iranian leaders of the Nationalist, Liberal, and Social-Democratic Orientation.” Abrahamian (1982) notes “the shah offered premiership to Dr. Ali Amini, the American favorite. The United States favored Amini for a number of reasons… As finance minister in Mossadeq’s administration, he had remained on speaking terms with many leaders of the National Front… the shah intensely disliked Amini, distrusted his past associations with Qavam [Qawamol-Saltana] and Mossadeq, and suspected him of planning political changes as well as economic reforms.” Abrahamian continues saying “On taking office, Amini made a series of controversial decisions. He dissolved the newly elected Twentieth Maijles, many of whose members were conservative landlords… He initiated discussions with the National front. Moreover, he gave three ministries to middle-class reformers… The Justice Ministry… [went to] a former Tudeh leader… The Education Ministry went to Muhammad Derekhshesh… [who] drew support from both the Tudeh and the National Front.” Abrahamian also notes within four months, Arsanjani [appointed by Amini] lanced Iran’s first serious nationwide attempt to redistribute land.” Kauz et al. (2001) note that “after the coup d’etat of August 1953 that the Shah assumed full control of the political process. Although elections continued to be held, parties and open political dissent were outlawed.” Rubin (1981) notes “Amini [was] a member of one of Iran’s leading landowning families…[but] Amini’s theoretical views were so different from those of the shah, who had long favored redistribution of Iran’s land, but that Amini wanted a more systematic and far-reaching change. The shah was suspicious: Amini had, after all, been an activist in the National Front… nor was the shah willing to follow Amini’s proposals for comprehensive economic planning and a strong anticorruption drive.”

Years: 1962-1963

Head of government: Asadullah Alam

Ideology: Right

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party. World Statesmen identifies head of government’s party as Mardom Party in 1962 and IN (Iran Novin) in 1963. Perspective monde identifies leader party as People’s Party. *Iran: a country study* identifies Alam’s party as Mardom Party: “The ‘opposition’ Mardom (People’s) Party was set up first under Asadollah Alam, a confidant of the Shahs.” In V-Party (2020), 3 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-right” (0.803) in 1971. Perspective Monde identifies Alam as right: “droite modérée.”

Years: 1964

Head of government: Ali Mansur

Ideology: Right

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government party. Perspective monde identifies leader party as New Iran Party. Perspective monde identifies leader ideology as center right. *Iran: a country study* identifies Mansur’s party as Iran Novin Party: “In December, Mansur converted the Progressive Center into a political party, the Iran Novin. In March 1964, Alam resigned and the shah appointed Mansur prime minister, at the head of an Iran Novin-led government.” In V-Party (2020), 3 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-right” (0.649) in 1971. Perspective Monde identifies Mansur as right: “droite modérée.”

Years: 1965-1976

Head of government: Amir Abbas Hoveida

Ideology: Right

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party. Perspective monde identifies leader party as New Iranian Party from 1965-1975 and Resurrection Part from 1975-1977. Weinbaum (1973)identifies Hoveida’s party as Iran Novin Party from 1965 to 1974: “A record 4.9 million voters in July 1971 gave a lopsided victory to Prime Minster Amis Abbas Hoveyda’s *Iran Novin* (New Iran) Party.” *Civilisations* identifies Hoveida’s party as Rastakhiz (National Resurgence Party) from 1975 to 1976: “Le Parti Rastakhiz...Il est probable qu’une autre idée air également poussé le Chah à prendre cette decision, à savoir éliminer indirectement le parti Iran Novine qui était devenu très puissant et était l’instrument du pouvoir et de l’influence du premier minister Hoveyda. Ce parti, qui serait la seule formation politique autorisée, devait être par ailleurs présidée par Amir Abbas Hoveyda.” *Iran: a country study* identifies Hoveida’s party as National Resurgence Party between 1975-1976: “What was purported to be an approximation of a Western-style bipartisan system came to an abrupt end on March 2, 1975, when the shah ordered a new political structure established under a single government-sponsored political party… Not surprisingly all existing parties announced their dissolution on the same day and joined the Rastakhiz Party… Under the charge of Prime Minister Hoveyda… the Rastakhiz Party was intended as a permanent institution.” In V-Party (2020), 3 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-right” (0.649) in 1971 and 1975. Abrahamian (2008) notes, “The Resurgence Party… announced that it would observe the principles of ‘democratic centralism,’ synthesise [sic] the best of ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism,’ [and] establish ‘dialectical’ links between government and population.” Perspective Monde identifies Hoveida as right: “droite modérée.” Rulers notes that Hoveida “was appointed to the board of the National Iranian Oil Company… [and] continued the policy of land redistribution.”

Years: 1977-1978

Head of government: Jamshid Amouzegar

Ideology: Rightist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party. Perspective monde identifies leader party as Resurrection Party. Political Handbook of the World identifies Amouzegar’s party as National Resurgence Party (NRP). World Statesmen identifies head of government’s part as Resurgence Party. In V-Party (2020), 3 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-right” (0.739) in 1975. Historical Dictionary of Iran (1995) notes after studying in the US that Amouzegar “accepted a position with the U.S. Agency for International Development” later as Prime Minister he was “Considered a supreme technocrat and was chosen to lead the liberal progressive wing of the Rastakhiz Party.” Abrahamian (1982) notes Amouzegar as an “American-educated technocrat who headed the more liberal “progressive wing” of the Resurgence party.” Abrahamian notes that “he [the Shah] created the Resurgence party and announced that in the future he would have a one-party state. In making the announcement, he argued that those reluctant to join the single party must be secret Tudeh sympathizers.” Continuing, Abrahamian says “The Resurgence party was designed by two groups of very divergent advisers. One group was formed of young political scientists with Ph.D.’s from American universities… The second group of advisers was formed of ex-communists… who had left the Tudeh in the early 1950s… This group argued that only a Leninist-style organization could mobilize the masses… and lead the way to a fully modern society…[but] However, strange its origins, the main goal of the Resurgence party was quite clear. It was to transform the somewhat old-fashioned military dictatorship into a totalitarian-style one-party state.”

Years: 1979

Head of government: Revolutionary Council

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party. Perspective monde does not identify leader party. *Country Studies Iran Country Studies* identifies Mehdi Bazargan as Prime Minister in 1979 and as a member of Iran Freedom Movement (IFM): “The first phase coincided with the provisional government of Prime Minister Bazargan, from February to November 1979” and “Of the National Front Parties that managed to survive the post-1963 clampdown, the most prominent was the… Iran Freedom Movement, led by Mehdi Bazargan.” According to *Country Studies Iran Country* Studies, following the Iran hostage crisis, Bazargan resigned. Because there was no prime minister to replace him “The Revolutionary Council took over the prime minister’s functions, pending presidential and Majlis elections.” Historical Dictionary of Iran (1995) notes that “the IRP, along with the Revolutionary Council was the most important wielder of political influence [and] not surprisingly, there was considerable overlap in membership of these two organizations,” moreover the IRP “called for nationalization of major industries, an Islamic university system, and programs to aid the poor. Its members denounced liberalism.” The Historical Dictionary also notes “The majority of the members, however, were clerical populists closely associated with the revolutionary Islamic ideology of Khomeini” as “Khoemeini and his supporters [had] worked to consolidate power … [where] the revolutionary council was formed shortly after”. Kauz, et al. (2001) note that in early 1978 supporters of exiled Ayatollah Khomeini launched a new campaign… [and] Out of tactical considerations, a broad spectrum of liberal and leftist opposition parties adopted Khomeini’s demand for an Islamic Republic... Throughout his rule, Khomeini strengthened the theocratic aspects of the new order… [and Leftist and liberal parties that opposed the concentration in powers in the clergy saw their activities hampered already before the 1979 elections, and were later banned one after another.”

In addition, Kauz et al. (2001) note that rightist Khomeini in “the new Constitution finalized by an elected Assembly… referred explicitly to Khomeini as the ‘recognized Leader by a decisive majority of the people.” Hasmi (1981) notes that the at the time of the Iranian Revolution a year prior, “the upheaval from which Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini emerged as patriarch was in effect a dual revolution… hatred for Pahlavi monarchism and revulsion at un-Islamic “Westernism.”… The revolution which had ousted the Shah was achieved by a disparate coalition of forces… an urban guerrilla group of Islamic socialists… an organization of atheistic Marxists, and the National Front, an association of Western-oriented followers of the late Iranian Nationalist.” However, Hasmi (1981) continues to note rightist control of the group, saying “the tenuous alliance [of these coalitions] was dominated by Khomeini and the Islamic rightist of the clergy.” Maloney (2020) notes that “the second factor that shaped the Islamic Republic’s early approach to the economy was the fierce philosophical dispute within the revolutionary coalition itself. The powerful leftist component of the anti-shah movement, and even some clerics, had adopted 1960s-era Marxist dogma that sought an economy centered on “social justice”.” Salehi-Isfahani (2019) writes “Unlike the socialist revolutions of the last century, the Islamic Revolution of Iran did not identify itself with the working class or the peasantry, and did not bring a well-defined economic strategy to reorganize the economy. Apart from eliminating the interest rate from the banking system, which was achieved in name only, the revolution put forward few specific economic policies that could be called an Islamic economic development strategy. To be sure, its populist and pro-poor rhetoric was quite distinct from the Pahlavi regime it replaced, but its actual policies could be found in the toolboxes of most developing countries and international organizations. For the most part, pragmatism and the worldviews of individual leaders who commanded the state machinery—prime ministers in the 1980s and presidents afterwards—determined the direction in which the economy moved. The strong anti-market policies of the 1980s, when the government rationed goods and took over banks and large industries, were more the result of circumstances than ideology—the eight-year war with Iraq and the flight of the Pahlavi-era upper class.”

Years: 1980

Head of government: Mohammad Ali Raja’i

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party. Perspective monde identifies leader party as Party of the Islamic Republic. *Country Studies Iran Country Studies* identifies Raja’i’s party as Islamic Republic Party (IRP): “After a two-month deadlock… over the selection of the prime minister, Bani Sadr was forced to accept the IRP candidate, Mohammad Ali Rajai.” Historical Dictionary of Iran (1995) notes “Raja’I acquired the position of prime minister through the support of his patrons in the Islamic Republican Party (IRP). In V-Party (2020), 3 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-right” (1.388) in 1980. Petrossian (1981) notes that “The President [Bani-Sadr] tried to recoup his losses by appointing a Prime Minister before the Majlis opened its first session… but… he was forced to accept the prime ministerial candidate of the rival Islamic Republican Party (IRP), Mohammad Ali Rajai.” Hashmi (1981) notes that Bani-Sadr, who opposed Ali Raja’I as identified above, himself was leftist, “Bani-Sadr. An Islamic socialist economist.” The Historical Dictionary of Iran (1995) notes that the Islamic Republican Party “called for nationalization of major industries, an Islamic university system, and programs to aid the poor. Its members denounced liberalism.” Tachau (1994) notes of the IRP, “the Islamic Republican Party… was the vehicle of the staunchly pro-Khomeini clergy.” Hashmi (1981) notes of the IRP that it was “Khomeini’s ideological progeny, the Islamic Republican Party.” The leader profile identifies Khomeini as rightist. Petrossian (1981) writes that “Rajai represents a generation of middle-aged Iranians who spent the Shah years in jail or in semi-underground opposition. His credentials are, if anything, liberal with a heavy dose of religion. In 1960, he was associated with the movement of progressive lay Moslem leaders led by the post-revolutionary Prime Minister.” Salehi-Isfahani (2019) writes “Unlike the socialist revolutions of the last century, the Islamic Revolution of Iran did not identify itself with the working class or the peasantry, and did not bring a well-defined economic strategy to reorganize the economy. Apart from eliminating the interest rate from the banking system, which was achieved in name only, the revolution put forward few specific economic policies that could be called an Islamic economic development strategy. To be sure, its populist and pro-poor rhetoric was quite distinct from the Pahlavi regime it replaced, but its actual policies could be found in the toolboxes of most developing countries and international organizations. For the most part, pragmatism and the worldviews of individual leaders who commanded the state machinery—prime ministers in the 1980s and presidents afterwards—determined the direction in which the economy moved. The strong anti-market policies of the 1980s, when the government rationed goods and took over banks and large industries, were more the result of circumstances than ideology—the eight-year war with Iraq and the flight of the Pahlavi-era upper class.”

Years: 1981-1988

Head of government: Mir Hossein Moussavi

Ideology: Centrist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party. Perspective monde identifies leader party as Party of the Islamic Republic until 1987 and as independent afterwards. World Statesmen (2020) identifies party affiliation as IRP from 1981-1986, and none after 1987. In V-Party (2020), 3 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-right” (1.388) in 1980 and 1984. Behrooz (1991) identifies a split between reformists and conservatives in the IRP, and identifies Moussavi as reformist: “Clearly the economy of the IRP is based on the capitalist mode of production… At the core of the reformist-conservative debate was state-capitalism vs. non-state ‘laissez-faire’ capitalism […]. [Khomeini’s] support for the Musavi Cabinet – as the most evident manifestation of the reformist faction.” Salehi-Isfahani (2019) writes “Unlike the socialist revolutions of the last century, the Islamic Revolution of Iran did not identify itself with the working class or the peasantry, and did not bring a well-defined economic strategy to reorganize the economy. Apart from eliminating the interest rate from the banking system, which was achieved in name only, the revolution put forward few specific economic policies that could be called an Islamic economic development strategy. To be sure, its populist and pro-poor rhetoric was quite distinct from the Pahlavi regime it replaced, but its actual policies could be found in the toolboxes of most developing countries and international organizations. For the most part, pragmatism and the worldviews of individual leaders who commanded the state machinery—prime ministers in the 1980s and presidents afterwards—determined the direction in which the economy moved. The strong anti-market policies of the 1980s, when the government rationed goods and took over banks and large industries, were more the result of circumstances than ideology—the eight-year war with Iraq and the flight of the Pahlavi-era upper class.”

Years: 1989-1996

Leader: Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani

Ideology: Rightist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies leader’s party as none. Perspective monde identifies leader’s party as Society of Militant Clerics. In V-Party (2020), 3 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-right” (1.584) in 1992 and “Right” (1.692) in 1996. Iran Data Portal (2020) notes that the “Assembly of Militant Clerics (MRM) was founded in 1988 as a result of a split within the Society of Combatant Clergy of Tehran (JRM). Some left-wing members departed JRM over differences in the association’s stance towards economic policy… In contrast to JRM, the newly founded MRM believed in state intervention in the economy to support lower segments of society… in 1988… Speaker Akbar Rafsanjani (a prominent member of the JRM) was elected president.” Wells (1999) identifies JRM as right: “Opposed to them are the so-called *Hujjatis*. This faction is Islamic Iran’s equivalent of a radical right, and is comprised of both economic conservatives and cultural extremists… Their main political organization throughout the 1980s and 1990s has been the Society of Combatant Clergymen (JRM).” Political Handbook of the World (2015) describes JRM as “hard-line, conservative… [which] vehemently opposed the reformist agenda and has remained committed to perpetuating the country’s rigid political and cultural restrictions… [and although] the JRM essentially concurred with the SC in the mid-1990s regarding proposed economic reform, it argued that ultimate political authority should remain with the nation’s religious leaders”.Fairbanks (1998) identifies JRM as rightist: “In 1997, by contrast, the candidate favored to win the presidency, Nateq-Nuri, had been formally chosen by the most powerful political organization of clerics, the right-wing conservative Jame’eh-ye Rowhaniyat-e Mobarez (JRM).” Pooya, Siamak and Potter (1999) notes “in the duet comprised by of Khamenei and Rafsanjani… Rafsanjani took the a moderate position, appealing to the Iranian technocrats and intellectuals. Meanwhile, the Islamic leftists were to be gradually pushed out of the country’s political scene… [as] during his eight years in power, Rafsanjani filled executive seats with his supporters… moderates and technocrats close to him, with few compromises to conservatives.” Pooya, Siamak and Potter also note of Rafanjani’s agency from Komenini, saying “Concurrent with the appointment of Ali Khamenei as the new leader, Rafanjani was elected the new president of the republic and the post of prime minister was eliminated. In effect, the politics authority of Khomeini was now embodied in a Khamenei-Rafsanjani dyad. This arrangement attested to the political skills of Rafanjani, who has proved himself adept at increasing the power of the political institution he controls.” They also note “The pragmatist faction of the Islamic Republic is formed around the personality and ideas of Hashemi Rafsanjani.” Perspective monde identifies leader ideology as “moderate left”. Rulers (2021) writes “Rafsanjani… He was arrested on a number of other occasions, serving his longest jail term in 1975-77 on charges of links with left-wing terrorists.” Salehi-Isfahani (2019) writes “In the early 1990s, to the surprise of the visiting teams from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the government’s rhetoric and policies radically shifted to become pro-market. Without any benefits in terms of loans from these organization, the administration of President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) implemented structural adjustment.”

Years: 1997-2004

Leader: Hojatolislam Mohammad Khatami

Ideology: Leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify leader’s party. Perspective monde identifies leader’s party as Society of Militant Clerics. Iran Data Portal (2020) notes that the Assembly of Militant Clerics (MRM) was founded in 1988 as a result of a split within the Society of Combatant Clergy of Tehran (JRM). Some left-wing members departed JRM over differences in the associations stance towards economic policy… In contrast to JRM, the newly founded MRM believed in state intervention in the economy to support lower segments of society” The Portal continues “In 1997, Mohammad Khatami, a leading member of the MRM ran for the presidency and won in a landslide victory.” In V-Party (2020), 3 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-right” (1.356) in 1996. In V-Party (2020), 3 experts identify head of government party as having “Negligible visible disagreement” in 1996. Perspective Monde identifies leader’s ideology as “moderate left”. Fairbanks(1998)also identifies MRM as left: “The MRM is considered ‘leftist’ on the Islamic Republic’s ideological spectrum for its statist economics and social egalitarianism.” Alaedini, Namazi and Potter (1999) note that “The leftist faction in the Islamic Republic is formed mainly around an organization known as *Majma’-e Ruhaniyyun-e Mabarez* (MRM).” Kauz et al. (2001) note that “The presidential elections of 1997 were the first free contest between clerical conservative hard liners and a leftist and liberal reformist coalition headed by Sayyid Mohammad Khatami.”

Years: 2005-2012

Head of government: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

Ideology: Rightist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies head of government’s party as AII (Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran). Perspective monde identifies head of government’s party as Alliance of the Builders of Islamist Iran. Perspective monde identifies head of government’s ideology as “moderate right”. Political Handbook of the World (2015) notes that AII “first emerged in the local elections of February 2003… with strong backing from senior conservatives in the political establishment. [They] Employ[ed] vague slogans calling for economic progress and adherence to “Islamic values”… [and now are] encompassing a range of views on economic policy but without a clear ideological vision, the group has become the most prominent conservative party, at least in the public arena. Salehi-Isfahani (2019) writes “the shift from the populist administrations of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-13) to the neoliberal Hassan Rouhani administration starting in 2013 did not amount to a break with economic ideology of the Islamic Republic.”

Years: 2013-2020

Head of government: Hojatolislam Hassan Rouhani

Ideology: Centrist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies head of government’s party as MDP. Varieties of Democracy identifies party affiliation as Combatant Clergy Association.. Perspective monde identifies head of government’s party as Moderation and Development party. The Political Handbook of the World identifies Rouhani’s party as Society of Combatant Clergy (JRM). World Statesmen identifies head of government’s party as JRM. The Tehran Times (2017) writes “The Moderation and Development Party will back Hassan Rouhani.” Perspective monde identifies head of government’s ideology as “center”. Salehi-Isfahani (2019) writes “the shift from the populist administrations of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-13) to the neoliberal Hassan Rouhani administration starting in 2013 did not amount to a break with economic ideology of the Islamic Republic.”

References:

Abrahamian, Ervand. “Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution.” *MERIP Reports*, no. 87, 1980, pp. 21–26. *JSTOR*, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3011417.

Abrahamian, Ervand. 1982. *Iran Between Two Revolutions.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. https://hdl-handle-net.proxy.uchicago.edu/2027/heb.00853. EPUB.

Ahmad, Asiyeh Ale. “Sayyed Mohsen Sadr.” Institute for Iranian Contemporary Studies. http://www.iichs.ir/News/1753/Sayyed-Mohsen-Sadr/?id=1753

Alaedini, Pooya, Namazi, Siamak and Potter, Lawrence. 1999. Iran. In: Kaple, Deborah A. and Delury, George E. World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties. 514-518.

Tachau, F. (1994). *Political parties of the Middle East and North Africa*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

“Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh Biography.” *The Mossadegh Project*. Web. http://www.mohammadmossadegh.com/biography/

Lorentz, John. 1995. Sharif-Emamim Ja’far. In: Lorentz, John. Historical Dictionary of Iran. 152-154.

Lorentz, John. 1995. Amuzegar, Jamshid. In: Lorentz, John. Historical Dictionary of Iran. 12-13.

"Iran." In *Political Handbook of the World 2015*, edited by Thomas Lansford, 663-79. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2015. http://library.cqpress.com.proxy.uchicago.edu/phw/phw2015\_Iran.

Hashmi, Sohail. 1981. “Iran’s Second Revolution.” *Harvard International Review.* Vol.4, No. 2. *JSTOR.* https://www.jstor.org/stable/42772547

Irandataportal.syr.edu. 2020. Assembly of Militant Clerics. (last checked July 23, 2020).

Lorentz, John. 1995. Raja’I Muhammad Ali. In: Lorentz, John. Historical Dictionary of Iran. 136-137.

Lorentz, John. 1995. Islamic Republican Party. In: Lorentz, John. Historical Dictionary of Iran. 77-78.

Lorentz, John. 1995. Revolutionary Council. In: Lorentz, John. Historical Dictionary of Iran. 138-140.

“Moderation and Development Party to back Rouhani.” 2017. *Tehran Times* (last checked on January 13th, 2021)

[Rulers.org](http://Rulers.org). 2020. Mossadegh, Mohammad. <http://www.rulers.org/indexm5.html#mossa> (last checked on May 4, 2020)

[Rulers.org](http://Rulers.org). 2020. Sharif-Emami, Jaafar. <http://www.rulers.org/indexs3.html#sharie> (last checked on May 4, 2020)

[Rulers.org](http://Rulers.org). 2020. Hoveida, Amir Abbas. <http://www.rulers.org/indexh3.html#hovei> (last checked on May 4, 2020)

Rulers.org. “Index Ra.” Accessed July 24, 2021. <http://rulers.org/indexr1.html#rafsa>.

Ralph Kauz, Hamid Khosravi Sharoudi, Andreas Rieck In: Nohlen Dieter, Florian Grotz, and Christof Hartmann (eds.). 2001. *Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook: Volume 1: Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia*. Oxford.

Rubin, Barry. 1980. “Paved with Good Intentions. The American Experience and Iran.” New York, New York: Oxford University Press. https://web.archive.org/web/20131021121704/http://www.gloria-center.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Paved-with-Good-Intentions-final.pdf

Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad. "Iran's Economy 40 Years After the Islamic Revolution." Brookings. Last modified March 14, 2019. Accessed August 1, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/14/irans-economy-40-years-after-the-islamic-revolution/.

Engineer, Asghar Ali. “Revolution Going Awry?” *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 16, no. 25/26, 1981, pp. 1091–1093. *JSTOR*, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4369961.

Kazemzadeh, Masoud. “Intra-Elite Factionalism and the 2004 Majles Elections in Iran.” *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 44, no. 2, 2008, pp. 189–214. *JSTOR*, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40262567.

Nader, Alireza, et al. “Five Scenarios for Succession of the Supreme Leader in the Near Term.” *The Next Supreme Leader: Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran*, RAND Corporation, 2011, pp. 45–84. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1052osd.12.

Fairbanks, Stephen C. “Theocracy versus Democracy: Iran Considers Political Parties.” *Middle East Journal*, vol. 52, no. 1, 1998, pp. 17–31. *JSTOR*, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4329151.

Petrossian, Vahe. 1981. “Iran’s Crisis of Leadership.” *The World Today*, vol. 31, No. 2. *JSTOR*. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40395259

Weinbaum, Marvin G. “Iran Finds a Party System: The Institutionalization of ‘Iran Novin.’” *Middle East Journal*, vol. 27, no. 4, 1973, pp. 439–455. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4325140.

http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3507/1/PhD\_Ariabarzan\_Mohammadighalehtaki.pdf?DDD35+

NAHAVANDI, Firouzeh. “L'EVOLUTION DES PARTIS POLITIQUES IRANIENS - 1941-1978 / THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN IRAN - 1941-1978.” *Civilisations*, vol. 34, no. 1/2, 1984, pp. 323–366. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/41803079.